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MISSOURI SECTION
NOTES
THE COLLATERAL SOURCE DOCTRINE IN MISSOURI
Two results are achieved by requiring a tortious defendant to
pay damages to an injured plaintiff. The plaintiff is compensated
and, at least in a pecuniary sense, is restored to his condition as
it existed prior to the tortious act. The compensation of the
plaintiff is said to be the raison d'etre of damages., However, an
additional result is reached; the tortious defendant is penalized.
Modern judicial thought apparently considers the penal aspect
of damages as an incidental by-product. The possible deterrent
effect and the satisfaction of the ancient desire for vengeance 2
are de-emphasized.
In most cases it cannot be ascertained whether the damages
are serving a compensatory or a penal purpose; the effects, from
which the purpose might be inferred, are compatible with either.
In some situations, however, the dominant motive can be isolated
to some extent. The penal effect is sought in those cases in which
exemplary damages are imposed. 3 Also it has been observed that
the causal remoteness of the consequences for which a defendant
will be held liable varies directly with the "fault" of the de-
fendant.4
A determination as to which of the two motives is dominant
could also be attempted in those cases in which the injured plain-
tiff has received compensation from a source independent of the
tortfeasor. The general problem can best be illustrated by con-
sidering a hypothetical case: A is hit and injured by an automo-
bile negligently operated by B. C, an eccentric millionaire, takes
A to a hospital and pays all of A's medical expenses. C then goes
1. SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 30 (9th ed. 1912):
In all cases, then, of civil injury and of breach of contract the de-
clared object of awarding damages is to give compensation for pecuni-
ary loss; that is, to put the plaintiff in the same position, so far as
money can do it, as he would have been if the contract had been per-
formed or the tort not committed.
2. DEuTERONoMY 19: 21: "And thine eye shall not pity; but life shall go
for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."
8. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 275 (1935).
4. PRossER, ToRTs 457 (1941).
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to Afghanistan. A sues B. Should medical expenses be a proper
element of damages in that action?
One answer is that the gift from C to A should be considered
as wholly unconnected with the rest of the case and should have
no mitigating effect on the measure of damages. Therefore the
medical expenses should be allowed as damages. This answer is
perhaps unrealistic, because the gift is connected with the rest
of the case. If A had not been injured the gift would not have
been given. Although the law sometimes refuses to attach legal
significance to one incident factually connected with a series of
incidents which do have legal significance, a factually connected
incident should not be disregarded without good reason.5
Another answer would be that A should not recover for his
medical expenses because he had no medical expenses. This
answer clearly is in harmony with the compensation principle.
5. Another somewhat more persuasive answer is that the medical expense
should be a proper element of damages because C intended to benefit A. If
the expenses were not allowed, the net effect would be to bestow a benefit on
B, not A, and the intent of the donor would be frustrated. The policy of
allowing a donor to make a gift to whomever he chooses should in this case
override the policy of restricting recovery to an amount sufficient to com-
pensate the plaintiff. Something more than compensation is allowed, but the
penal motive is not obviously present. The main difficulty with this answer
is that it assumes a considerable knowledge of the intent of the donor which
does not in fact exist. C intended to benefit A, and did benefit A. At the
time that C made the gift it had not been established that A could recover
from B. To the extent that C intended to convert a'possible compensation to
an accomplished compensation, his intent has been fulfilled. There is no
showing that C intended to accomplish anything other than conversion.
Suppose that C, instead of directly paying A's bills had paid them in-
directly by establishing prior to the injury a charitable hospital at which A
received free treatment. In such a case it would be more difficult to argue
that C's intent would be frustrated by not allowing A to recover from B the
reasonable value of the medical services received. Although it does not
necessarily follow, the intent of C could easily be the same whether he paid
A's bills directly or indirectly. The policy of not frustrating the intent of
the donor could be viewed as a policy of not frustrating an intent which the
donor may or may not have had, i.e., an intent not to benefit B as well as A.
Viewed in this manner the policy may not be strong enough to override the
opposing policy of limiting the recovery to compensation only. The position
could be taken that recovery should be allowed if the donor so intended, and
that an appropriate legal apparatus should be set up to determine the intent
of the donor.
It could also be argued that the real problem here is one of the proper
disposition of extra money, i.e., money received from a source not usually
present in tort cases, and that it is better to give it to injured A than to B.
Adherents of this approach could say that there is no penal motive involved,
that it is only a question of allocating a windfall. It may be that this ap-
proach assumes the question by characterizing the money received from C
as "extra." Perhaps that money is not really "extra" until it is decided that
A should recover the value of the medical expenses from B.
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In dealing with this problem the courts have developed the
"'collateral source" doctrine, which has been widely accepted in
the United States.6 Under the collateral source doctrine the
damages recoverable from a tortious defendant are not mitigated
by the fact that the plaintiff has received compensation from
someone unconnected with the defendant. It is possible to con-
sider the collateral source doctrine as a manifestation of the
dominance of the penal motive in this area of the law of damages,
because although the compensation effect has been achieved
prior to litigation the defendant still must pay damages. The
penal motive, if actually present, is unexpressed by the courts
and is probably unconscious.
This note is an attempt to discover if an unconscious penal pur-
pose is in fact consistently dominant by examining the application
of the collateral source doctrine by the Missouri courts, and to
evaluate in terms of social desirability the decisions of the Mis-
souri courts in this area of the law of damages. Although the
doctrine is applicable to cases involving either damage to prop-
erty or personal injuries, this note will be limited to a discus-
sion of the personal injury cases.
In personal injury cases where the injured person has been
compensated under an insurance policy not procured by the
defendant, the rule is well established in Missouri that such
compensation does not reduce the amount of damages recover-
able from the tortfeasor.7 It should be noted that life insurers
and personal injury insurers are not entitled to subrogation,8
and that therefore the insurer has no legal right to be reim-
bursed. The question of the effect of insurance payments on
the measure of damages was first raised in Missouri in 1885 in
the case of Carroll v. Missouri Pacific Ry.9 It was there held
that the fact that the plaintiff, in an action for the wrongful
6. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 920 comment e; § 924 comment c, f (1939);
McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 310, 323, 324 (1935). The doctrine is also accepted
in England: Bradburn v. Great Western Railway, L.R. 10 Ex. 1 (1874);
Yates v. Whyte, 4 Bing. N.C. 272, 132 Eng. Rep. 793 (1838).
7. Jackson v. Thompson, 358 Mo. 1001, 218 S.W.2d 97 (1949); Pogue v.
Rosegrant, 98 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1936); Carroll v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 88 Mo.
239 (1885); Bright v. Thacher, 202 Mo. App. 301, 215 S.W. 788 (1919);
Dover v. Mississippi River and Bonne Terre Ry., 100 Mo. App. 330, 73
S.W. 298 (1903). Cf. Gould v. Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad, 315 Mo. 713,
290 S.W. 135 1926).
8. VANCE, INSURANCE 796, 797 (Anderson 3d ed. 1951).
9. 88 Mo. 239 (1885).
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death of her husband, had received the benefit of an insurance
policy on his life should not be considered as a defense or in
mitigation of damages in her action against the tortfeasor. Not
much later the rule was extended to cases involving damage to
property.10 In 1903, in a case where the defendant-employer had
paid half of the premiums on the plaintiff-employee's accident
insurance policy, an instruction allowing but not requiring the
jury to consider the acceptance of benefits under the policy in
mitigation of damages was sustained.11 This instruction, how-
ever, was challenged only by the defendant and not by the plain-
tiff. The rationale for this rule denying mitigation because of
insurance benefits as applied to hospital and other medical ex-
penses is that the plaintiff became liable for such expenses when
the services were rendered and was thereby damaged, and that
it is no concern of the defendant how the plaintiff provided the
funds to pay the bills.22 A somewhat similar rationale could be
used if the plaintiff's insurance indemnified him against loss of
wages; the plaintiff's loss occurred when he did not work, and
events happening after the loss occurred do not affect that loss.
It is obvious that the requirement that the defendant pay un-
mitigated damages in these cases is motivated by something
other than a pure desire for compensation. It does not neces-
sarily follow, however, that the penal motive is dominant. The
courts may have felt that it was more important to reward the
prudence and foresight of the plaintiff thin it was to limit dam-
ages to compensation, and for that reason attached no legal
significance to the receipt of benefits by the plaintiff from his
insurance. The courts also may have been influenced by the fact
that many people use life insurance policies as a form of savings
and consider the payment of the proceeds of a policy as a return
of an investment rather than as compensation for a loss.
The problem of collateral source compensation also arises when
an employer continues to pay wages to an employee who was
injured by a third person. The solution of this problem prior to
the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act caused the
10. Mathews v. St. Louis and San Francisco Ry., 121 Mo. 298, 24 S.W.
591 (1893), aff'd, 165 U.S. 1 (1896); Dillon v. Hunt, 105 Mo. 154, 16 S.W.
516 (1891).
11. Dover v. Mississippi River and Bonne Terre Ry., 100 Mo. App.
330, 73 S.W. 298 (1903).
12. Pogue v. Rosegrant, 98 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1936).
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Missouri courts some difficulty. In 1894 the Kansas City Court of
Appeals held that an injured employee could not recover for loss
of wages during his disability if his employer had continued to
pay him. 13 The court said in that case:
... no deduction or diminution thereof was made by his
employers. He did not, therefore, lose his wages and was,
of course, not damaged in this respect.... We are confident
that in a case where mere compensation for lose is sought,
there can not be allowed, under the name of compensation, a
sum which has not been lost.1
A few months later, however, the Supreme Court of Missouri
took the antithetical position 15 and said:
Most clearly, it was no defense to this action to show that
plaintiff's employer ... had continued his salary while he
was disabled by an injury caused by defendant. There can
be no abatement of damages on the ground of partial com-
pensation, when it comes from a collateral source, indepen-
dent of defendant. 18
These two conflicting views were reconciled by the Missouri
Supreme Court in the case of Moon v. St. Louis Transit Co.,'7
although the previous cases were not discussed. The court there
recognized that if the employer had made wage payments purely
gratuitously they could not be considered in mitigation of dam-
ages, because there is no more reason to deduct from damages
a gift from an employer than there is to deduct a gift from a
stranger. The court held, however, that since the employee had
performed some services for the employer during the period of
his disability, and the employer had continued to pay his wages,
the employee could not recover for the loss of wages. This de-
cision presumably is still controlling in cases where an employer
continues to pay wages when he is not compelled to do so by the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
The rule in the Moon case is logical in a quasi-mathematical
sense. The formula for computing damages for loss of wages is:
damages- (wage prior to injury- wage after injury) x (period
of disability).18 If the employee continues to perform some ser-
13. Ephland v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 57 Mo. App. 147 (1894).
14. Id. at 160,,161.
15. Williams v. St. Louis and San Francisco Ry., 123 Mo. 573, 27 S.W.
387 (1894).
16. Id. at 585, 27 S.W. at 391.
17. 247 Mo. 227, 152 S.W. 303 (1912).
18. See, e. g., Bradfield v. Kansas City, 204 S.W. 819 (Mo. App. 1918).
The formula is not expressed in algebraic terms in this case.
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vices, although less in quantity or different in quality, and his
employer continues to pay him full wages, it is apparent that
the damages computed by the formula would be zero. It is a
situation in which no loss has occurred, rather than one in which
a loss has been compensated from a collateral source. This
rationale tends to overlook a crucial point. The mere fact that
the employee continued to do some work does not mean that he
earned a full wage; the element of gratuity may be very strong
in the employer's action. The difficulties of proof involved, how-
ever, in the factual question of when an employee is earning his
full wage may justify the adoption of the "some services" crite-
rion of the Moon case. Whether or not that criterion is considered
correct, it is obvious that the rule in the Moon case makes a con-
scious effort to measure damages on a purely compensatory basis.
It does not succeed, because it does allow double compensation if
the wages were purely gratuitous.
Employers to whom the Missouri Workmen's Compensation
Act 9 applies20 are required to furnish medical expenses up to a
specified amount2' and wage payments on a prescribed scale 22
to a completely or partially disabled employee, or in the case of
death, to his dependents,2 3 if the employee's injuries were re-
ceived in and arose out of the course of his employment. 24 These
provisions are applicable even though the injuries were caused
by the negligence of some third person.25 The Act severely limits
the employee's common law rights against his employer for
negligence,26 but does not destroy the employee's action against
a third person tortfeasor.27 Thus an employee may receive com-
19. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 287.010 et seq. (1949).
20. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.090 (1949).
21. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.140 (Supp. 1951).
22. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.160 (1949); Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.170 (Supp.
1951).
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.240 (1949).
24. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (1949).
25. Schumacher v. Leslie, 360 Mo. 1238, 232 S.W.2d 913 (1950); Gardner
v. Stout, 342 Mo. 1206, 119 S.W.2d 790 (1938); McKenzie v. Missouri
Stables, Inc., 225 Mo. App. 64, 34 S.W.2d 136 (1930).
26. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (1949) ; General Motors Corp. v. Holler, 150
F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1945); State ex Tel. National Lead Co. v. Smith, 134
S.W.2d 1061 (Mo. App. 1939). The employee's common law rights have
not been completely extinguished. McDaniel v. Kerr, 258 S.W.2d 629 (Mo.
1953).
27. Schumacher v. Leslie, 360 Mo. 1238, 232 S.W.2d 913 (1950); Smith
v. Siedhoff, 209 S.W.2d 233 (Mo. 1948); DeMoulin v. Roetheli, 354 Mo. 425,
189 S.W.2d 562 (1945); Reiling v. Russell, 345 Mo. 517, 134 S.W.2d 33
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pensation under the Act from his employer for medical ex-
penses and loss of wages, and sue a third person whose negli-
gence caused the injury. Under the construction which the
Missouri courts have placed upon section 287.150 of the 1949
Revised Statutes, 8 medical expenses and loss of wages are proper
elements of damages in such an action. In the case of McKenzie
v. Missouri Stables, Inc.," it was held that under section 287.150
either the employer or the employee could bring the action
against the negligent third person. If the employee brings the
action, he is an express trustee for the employer's benefit of an
amount of the proceeds of the action equal to the compensation
he has received from the employer, and must credit any surplus
against compensation payments payable by his employer in the
future. Conversely, if the employer brings the action, he is an
express trustee for the benefit of the employee of any recovery
exceeding the amount paid as compensation. The employer must
pay this surplus to the employee, and is entitled to credit the
amount so paid against future payments.
Negligence on the part of the employer, however, will not bar
the action by either the employee or the employer against a
concurrently negligent defendant. 0 A settlement between the
(1939); General Box Co. v. Missouri Utilities Co., 331 Mo. 845, 55 S.W.2d
442 (1932); Brouk v. United Wood Heel Co., 145 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. App.
1940); American Veterinary Laboratories v. Campbell Co., 227 Mo. App.
799, 59 S.W.2d 53 (1933); Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo. App. 543,
38 S.W.2d 497 (1931); McKenzie v. Missouri Stables, Inc., 225 Mo. App.
64, 34 S.W.2d 136 (1930). It should be noted that under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the third person can force the employee to join the em-
ployer and his insurer as parties plaintiff. Du Vaul v. Miller, 13 F.R.D.
197 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
28. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.150 (1949). Injured employee may hold third
person, when-effect:
Where a third person is liable to the employee or to the dependents,
for the injury or death, the employer shall be subrogated to the right
of the employee gr to the dependents against such third person, and
the recovery by such employer shall not be limited to the amount pay-
able as compensation to such employee or dependents, but such em-
ployer may recover any amount which such employee or his dependents
would have been entitled to recover. Any recovery by the employer
against such third person, in excess of the compensation paid by the
employer, after deducting the expense of making such recovery shall
be paid forthwith to the employee or to the dependents, and shall be
treated as an advance payment by the employer, on account of any
future installments of compensation.
29. 225 Mo. App. 64, 34 S.W.2d 136 (1930).
30. General Box Co. v. Missouri Utilities Co., 331 Mo. 845, 55 S.W.2d
442 (1932). Contributory negligence on the part of the injured employee
will bar the action by either the employee or the employer against the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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employee and the tortfeasor does not bar the action by the em-
ployer,31 although presumably his recovery would be limited to
the amount actually paid or payable as compensation. The em-
ployer has no action against the tortfeasor unless he has paid
or is liable to pay compensation.32
The net effect is that compensation received by an employee
under the Workmen's Compensation Act neither reduces the
amount of damages recoverable from a third party tortfeasor
nor permits double compensation of the injured person, because
the collateral source, i.e., the employer, is allowed reimburse-
ment.3 3 The justice of such a result in a case where the employer
has not been concurrently negligent is apparent. The employee
is protected against harm by impecunious third persons, and the
damages paid by the financially responsible third person are
equal to the harm he caused. In this situation the legislature has
decreed that the compensation motive is dominant, and also that
the penal motive shall be given effect if the financial condition of
the negligent third person permits. The justness of reimbursing
the employer when he has also been negligent is not quite appar-
ent. Although the employee is compensated, the full force of the
penal motive is directed at the third party for the benefit of the
perhaps equally blameworthy employer.
The collateral source problem also arises when the plaintiff has
received compensation in some form from his family. In Morris
v. Grand Avenue Ry.,34 the plaintiff sought to recover expenses
for medicines and doctor's bills, but failed to prove that he had
paid or become liable for such expenses, although he introduced
evidence as to the value of the doctor's services. The instructions
given by the trial court allowed the jury to compensate the plain-
negligent third person. Anzer v. Humes-Deal Co., 332 Mo. 432, 58 S.W.2d
962 (1933).
31. Everard v. Woman's Home Companion Club, 234 Mo. App. 760, 122
S.W.2d 51 (1938).
32. Pfitzinger to the use of Stotscky v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 226 Mo.
App. 861, 46 S.W.2d 955 (1932). It has been indicated, however, that the
statute of limitations begins to run against the employer on the date of the
injury. Goldschmidt v. Pevely Dairy Co., 341 Mo. 982, 111 S.W.2d 1 (1937).
33. Schumacher v. Leslie, 306 Mo. 1238, 232 S.W.2d 913 (1950); State
ex rel. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Haid, 332 Mo. 616, 59 S.W.2d 690 (1933);
Anzer v. Humes-Deal Co., 332 Mo. 432, 58 S.W.2d 962 (1933); Brouk v.
United Wood Heel Co., 235 Mo. App. 511, 145 S.W.2d 475 (1940); Everard
v. Woman's Home Companion Reading Club, 234 Mo. App. 760, 122 S.W.2d
51 (1938) ; McKenzie v. Missouri Stables, Inc., 225 Mo. App. 64, 34 S.W.2d
136 (1930).
34. 144 Mo. 500, 46 S.W. 170 (1898).
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tiff for those expenses. The case was reversed and remanded
for that reason by the Missouri Supreme Court, which said:
... [The jury is] authorized to compensate him for his
pecuniary loss actually sustained, and not those that might
or would have occurred but for the interposition of others
through kindness or charity.
*.. [T] o authorize a recovery on the part of the injured
plaintiff, there must have been an actual loss to him of time
or money, or a liability that same may or will occur; ...
when loss has not or cannot occur by reason of the action
of others gratuitously exercised in behalf of the party in-jured, or when no legal liability has arisen by reason of re-
strictions of law against the intervening third party per-
forming the needful services, no action can be maintained.3 5
If a member of the plaintiff's family pays his medical bills, bills
for which the plaintiff became liable when the services were
received, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the value of the ser-
vices.36 The damage is sustained when the plaintiff incurs the
liability, and the method by which that liability is later dis-
charged has no effect on the measure of damages. However,
under the Morris case, if the plaintiff never became liable for his
medical expenses, he could not recover for them. Because ser-
vices rendered by one member of a family for another are pre-
sumed to .be gratuitous, the rule in the Morris case prevents re-
covery by a plaintiff for the reasonable value of nursing services
received by him from members of his family.3 7
The distinction between services rendered and liability in-
curred does not limit recovery to pure compensation because a
plaintiff is allowed to recover for liabilities incurred which were
35. Id. at 505, 507, 46 S.W. at 170, 171.
36. Gentili v. Dimaria, 89 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. App. 1936). Cf. Fisher v.
Ozark Milk Service Inc., 356 Mo. 95, 201 S.W.2d 305 (1947).
37. Gibney v. St. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 704, 103 S.W. 43 (1907);
Baldwin v. Kansas City Ry., 218 S.W. 955 (Mo. App. 1920). A different
result was reached in: Murray v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 101 Mo. 236, 13 S.W.
817 (1890) ; Kaiser v. St. Louis Transit Co., 108 Mo. App. 708, 84 S.W. 199
(1904); MacDonald v. St. Louis Transit Co., 108 Mo. App. 374, 83 S.W.
1001 (1904). These cases have not been expressly overruled on this point.
Medical and other expenses incurred in treating a deceased, and his
funeral expenses, are not proper elements of damage in a wrongful death
action unless the beneficiaries of the action were under a legal obligation
to pay such expenses. McCullough v. W. H. Powell Lumber Co., 205 Mo.
App. 15, 216 S.W. 803 (1919). If the members of the family who render
the service incur expenses incidental to the rendition of the services, e.g.,
bills for room and board if they have to leave home to care for the plaintiff,
the plaintiff may recover the amount of such bills. Dean v. Wabash R.R.,
229 Mo. 425, 129 S.W. 953 (1910).
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later gratuitously discharged by third persons. The proper dis-
tinction would be between gratuitous benefits on the one hand,
and presently existing liabilities and "out-of-pocket" expenses
on the other. The language in the Morris case opinion could be
construed as reaching either one of these two distinctions, and
the family services cases decided under that case construed it
as reaching the unsound one. Although the sound distinction is
a perfect expression of the pure compensation motive, it should
be noted that in some cases it leads to an extremely undesirable
result. If the family is poor and cannot afford to hire a nurse,
and some members are forced to neglect their own employment
to perform nursing services, compensation for those services is
denied. On the other hand, if the family can afford to hire an
outsider to do the nursing, the expenses are recoverable from
the person who caused the injury, and the richer family loses
neither time nor money. A preferable result was reached in the
earlier case of Kaiser v. St. Louis Transit Co.,38 where the court
said:
... Plaintiff would have required the attendance of a paid
nurse if his wife and daughter had not nursed him, and we
think the gratuity was to him and that he is entitled to the
benefit of it rather than the defendant.39
The unjust result reached under the Morris rule stems not from
the rule itself, but from the presumption applied in conjunction
with that rule. If services rendered by one member of a family
for another were not presumed to be gratuitous, the proper
result in these cases would be reached. If the liability of the
recipient member of the family to the serving member were
made contingent on recovery from the negligent outsider, the
policy of attempting to preserve familial tranquility, which the
presumption of donation was originally designed to effect, would
be maintained. To allow recovery for services rendered by
family members would be pure compensation uninfluenced by
penal motives, because in a very real sense it is not only the in-
jured individual who has been damaged but also the family unit
as a whole; in such cases there has been no collateral source
compensation.
The increase of social legislation in recent years has increased
the importance of the problem of the effect on the measure of
38. 108 Mo. App. 708, 84 S.W. 199 (1904).
39. Id. at 712, 84 S.W. at 200.
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damages of compensation received from governmental sources. 40
The question has not often arisen in Missouri, however. The
few cases dealing directly with the subject have held that such
compensation is not ground for mitigation. 41 The case of Demp-
sey v. Thompson,42 however, decided that the defendant is en-
titled to have the jury instructed in a personal injury action
that an award is not subject to federal or state income taxation
and should not include an allowance for such taxes. If the in-
come tax exemptions are considered as a passive form of govern-
mental compensation, this ruling is an exception to the collateral
source doctrine. It is, however, a correct implementation of the
general theory that damages in negligence cases are purely com-
pensatory.
Although a possibly unconscious penal motive may appear in
some of the cases, it cannot be said that the Missouri courts have
demonstrated a consistent preference for either the compensa-
tory or the penal motive in the collateral source cases. The in-
consistency is most strikingly shown by a comparison of the
rule in the Moon case 3 with the rule in the Morris case. 44 Under
the Moon rule the fact that the compensation from the collateral
source is gratuitous allows the plaintiff to recover the amount of
that compensation. Under the Morris rule the fact that the com-
pensation from the collateral source is gratuitous prohibits the
plaintiff from recovering the amount of that compensation. It
may be that the amount of compensation received from the col-
40. Note, 63 HARV. L. REV. 330 (1949).
41. Hilton v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W.2d 675 (1950); Gould v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 315 Mo. 713, 290 S.W. 135 (1926). In Burens v.
Wolfe Wear-U-Well Corp., 236 Mo. App. 892, 158 S.W.2d 175 (1942), which
was not a personal injury action, the court said:
.Furthermore, it would not have been proper for defendant to
plead #nd prove unemployment compensation received by plaintiff.
Such compensation is not a proper subject of mitigation. It is a
grant allowed according to a beneficent economic policy of the State,
designed to alleviate adversity and promote the public welfare. It is
not earned income of a recipient during a period of unemployment to
be used in mitigation or a wrong responsible for the loss of employ-
ment. A wrongdoer cannot diminish his liability to the extent of such
contributions, nor will he be permitted to benefit by payments made to
the injured person from collateral sources, whether in compensation
or as gratuities.
Id. at 898, 158 S.W.2d at 178, 179. The tort involved in the case was in-
tentional.
42. 251 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1952).
43. See note 18 supra.
44. See note 34 supra.
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